Abstract-In this paper, we consider the problem of anonymization on large networks. There are some anonymization methods for networks, but most of them can not be applied on large networks because of their complexity. We present an algorithm for k-degree anonymity on large networks. Given a network G, we construct a k-degree anonymous network,G, by the minimum number of edge modifications. We devise a simple and efficient algorithm for solving this problem on large networks. Our algorithm uses univariate micro-aggregation to anonymize the degree sequence, and then it modifies the graph structure to meet the k-degree anonymous sequence. We apply our algorithm to a different large real datasets and demonstrate their efficiency and practical utility.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, as more and more network data has been made publicly available, anonymization on network data has become an important concern. Backstrom et. al. [1] point out that the simple technique of anonymizing networks by removing the identities of the nodes before publishing the actual network does not always guarantee privacy. They show that there exist adversaries that can infer the identity of the nodes by solving a set of restricted graph isomorphism problems. Some approaches and methods have been imported from anonymization on relational data, but anonymizing network data has some peculiarities that make the approaches and methods from relational data to not work directly. In addition, divide-and-conquer methods do not apply to anonymization of network data due to the fact that registers are not separable, since removing or adding vertices and edges may affect other vertices and edges as well as the properties of the network [2] .
Although some approaches and methods have been developed for graph anonymization, they are applicable only to small and medium networks of, at most, a few thousands of nodes and edges. Anonymization on large networks is still an open problem.
In this paper we present our anonymization algorithm for large networks, based on the concept of k-degree anonymity. It works with simple, undirected and unlabelled networks. Because these networks have no attributes or labels in the edges, information is only in the structure of the network itself and, due to this, the adversary can use information about the structure of the network to attack the privacy. k-degree anonymity ensures the user's privacy when the attacker has degree-based knowledge on target nodes. This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we review the state of the art of anonymization on networks, specifically the k-anonymity-based methods. We discuss the preliminaries and the problem definition on Section III. Section IV introduces our algorithm for k-degree anonymity on large networks. Then, in Section V, we present the experiments and discuss the results. Finally, in Section VI, we present the conclusions and the future work.
II. k-ANONYMITY ON NETWORKS
There are three main categories of anonymization methods on network data: (1) Network modification approaches which anonymize a network by modifying (adding and/or deleting) edges or nodes in a network. (2) Clustering-based approaches (also known as generalization) which cluster nodes and edges into groups and anonymize a sub-network into a super-node in order to publish the aggregate information about structural properties. (3) And finally, differentially private approaches which guarantee that individuals are protected under the definition of differential privacy [3] . Differential privacy imposes a guarantee on the data release mechanism rather than on the data itself. The goal is to provide statistical information about the data while preserving the privacy of users.
Our main objective is to allow publishing network data without breaking user's privacy. But we are interested on publishing the entire network, not a summary or a statistic information about the network. Clustering-based approaches do not enable local structure data analysis and differential privacy does not allow us to release all structural information. So, if we want to analyse the structure of the network, both the local and the global structure, we have to use a network modification approach which allow us to deliver the entire network structure.
Randomization is the simplest way to anonymize a network by modification approaches. Randomization methods are based on adding random noise in original data. Hay et al. [4] proposed a method to anonymize unlabelled networks, called Random Perturbation, which is based on removing p edges at random and then adding random false p edges. Ying et al. [5] proposed a method, called Blockwise Random Add/Delete strategy or simply Rand Add/Del-B. This method divides the network into blocks according to the degree sequence and implements modifications (by adding and removing edges) on the nodes at high risk of re-identification, not at random over the entire set of nodes. Notice that the randomization approaches protect against re-identification in a probabilistic manner.
Another way to anonymize a network by modification approaches consist on edge addition and deletion to meet desired privacy constraints. One widely adopted strategy is based on the concept of k-anonymity. This concept was introduced by Sweeney [6] The k-anonymity model indicates that an attacker can not distinguish between different k records although he manages to find a group of quasi-identifiers. Therefore, the attacker can not re-identify an individual with a probability greater than 1 k . In general, the higher the k value, the greater the anonymization and the information loss. Let G(V, E) be a network where V is the node set and E is the edge set. In the extreme case of k = |V | all nodes in G(V, E) have the same degree. So, the probability of re-identification will be almost null, but the information loss will be very large, producing a useless anonymized network.
The k-anonymity model can be applied using different concepts when dealing with networks rather than relational data. A widely used option is to consider the node degree as a quasi-identifier. This corresponds to k-degree anonymity. In short, in k-degree anonymity we presume that the only possible attack is when the attacker knows the degree of some nodes. Therefore, if some node is identified with certainty with this information, then we have an information leakage. k-Anonymity methods are based on modifying the network structure (by adding and removing edges) to ensure that all nodes satisfy the k-anonymity for the degrees of the nodes. In other words, the main objective is that all nodes have at least k − 1 other nodes sharing the same degree. Liu and Terzi [7] develop a method which given a network G(V, E) and an integer k, finds a k-degree anonymous networkG(V,Ẽ) whereẼ ∩ E ≈ E, trying to minimize the number of changes on edges.
Pei and Zhou [2] consider as quasi-identifier the 1-neighbourhood sub-network of the objective nodes. Let k be a positive integer. For a vertex u ∈ V , u is k-anonymous in anonymizationG if there are at
Zhou et al. [8] consider all structural information about a target node as quasi-identifier and propose a new model called k-automorphism to anonymize a network and ensure privacy against this attack. They define a k-automorphic network as follows: given a network G, (a) if there exist k−1 automorphic functions
Hay et al. [9] go a step further. They propose a method, named k-candidate anonymity, that uses queries as quasi-identifier. In this method, a node v i is k-candidate anonymous with respect to question Q if there are at least k − 1 others nodes in the network with the same answer. Formally,
A network is kcandidate anonymous with respect to question Q if all of its nodes are k-candidate anonymous with respect to question Q. The question Q is modelled according to the knowledge of the adversary assumed.
Hay et al. [4] [9] proposed a method, called Vertex Refinement Queries, to model the knowledge of the adversary. This class of queries, with increasing attack power, models the local neighbourhood structure of a node in the network. The weakest knowledge query, H 0 (v j ), simply returns the label of the node v j . The queries are successively more descriptive:
returns the list of each neighbours' degree, and so on. The queries can be defined iteratively, where H i (v j ) returns the multi-set of values which are the result of evaluating H i−1 on the set of nodes adjacent to v j :
where
. . , v m are the nodes adjacent to v j .
A candidate set cand Hi for a query H i is a set of all nodes with the same value of H i . Therefore, the cardinality of a candidate set for H i is the number of indistinguishable nodes in G under H i . Note that if the cardinality of the smallest candidate set under H 1 is k, the probability of re-identification is 1 k . Hence, the k-degree anonymity value for G is k.
III. PRELIMINARIES Let G(V, E) be a simple graph, where V is the set of nodes and E the set of edges in G. We define n = |V | to denote the number of nodes and m = |E| to denote the number of edges. We use d to define the degree sequence of G, where d is a vector of length n and d i is the value of i-th element, that is, the degree of node v i ∈ V . We refer to the ordered degree sequence as a monotonic non-decreasing sequence of the vertex degrees, that is
Regarding to the degree sequence, notice that:
• The number of elements in the degree sequence is fixed by the number of nodes.
•
because the values of the degree sequence are node's degrees.
• The total number of edges of the graph is half the sum of the degree sequence, since each edge is counted twice in the degree sequence. Therefore,
The degree sequence is an interesting tool since the concept of k-degree anonymity for a graph can be directly mapped to its degree sequence, as Liu and Terzi showed in [7] and we recall in the following definitions: In order to modify the edge set of a given network, we can define three basic operations: edge switch, edge removal and edge addition. The edge switch between three nodes can be defined as follows:
Secondly, we define edge removal as follows: we select four nodes
Finally, we define edge addition as follows: we select two nodes v i , v j ∈ V where (v i , v j ) ∈ E and creates it. Note that
It is shown on Figure 1c .
IV. THE UMGA ALGORITHM
In this section, we present the UMGA (short for Univariate Micro-aggregation for Graph Anonymization) algorithm, designed to achieve k-degree anonymity on large, undirected and unlabelled networks. The algorithm performs modifications to the original network G(V, E) only on edges, E, by applying the three basic operations defined in the previous section. So, the node set V does not change during anonymization process. The UMGA is based on a two-step approach:
we construct a new sequenced that is kdegree anonymous. We use the function Δ to reduce the distance from the anonymized sequence to the original one, computed as:
2) Graph modification. By using the three basic edge modification operations defined in the previous section, we build a new networkG(V,Ẽ) where its degree sequence is equal tod.
The second step ensures that the newG network is kdegree anonymous and the lower the value Δ can be obtained in the first step also the lower the information loss of the anonymized network.
A. Degree Sequence's Anonymization
The objective of the first step is to anonymize the degree sequence of the original network, d. We use the Optimal Univariate Microaggregation [10] to achieve the best group distribution and then we compute the values for each group that minimize the distance Δ from the original degree sequence.
Without loss of generality, we assume d to be an ordered degree sequence of the original network. Otherwise, we apply a permutation f to the sequence to reorder the elements. Let k be an integer such that 1 ≤ k < n which is the k-degree anonymity value. Typically, k is much smaller than n. In order to apply the optimal univariate microaggregation, and according to Hansen and Mukherjee [10] , we construct a new directed network H k,n and get the optimal partition which is exactly the set of groups that corresponds to the arcs of the shortest path from node 0 to node n on this network. We denote by g the optimal partition, where g has
groups and each of them, g j , has between k and 2k − 1 items. Obviously, each d i ∈ d belongs to a specific group g j .
Next, we compute the matrix of differences, M p×2 , using each group of the partition. The first column contains the sum of differences between each element of the group and the arithmetic mean of all degrees that belong to the group, using floor function to round the mean value. The second column is computed in the same way, but using de ceiling function instead. Conceptually, M contains in the first column the number of degrees that we should decrease in this group to meet k-degree anonymity. These values are always a zero or positive. The second column contains the number of degrees that we should increase in this group to meet k-degree anonymity. These values are always negative or zero. Formally, for j = 1, · · · , p, each element m ji is computed as:
where |g j | denotes de cardinality of set g j .
A group with zero values on both columns should not apply any modification on its items. For that reason, we propose two methods in order to achieve the best combination on minimum time: 2) The Greedy Method: We define an iterative method and in each step values for m j are selected according to a probability distribution based on the size of values m j1 and m j2 . The lower the value is, the more probability to be chosen. More specifically,
Iterations are finished when a solution is found with p j=1 m j = 0 or when we have a fixed number of iterations without any improvement in the function p j=1 m j . After these computations, we have a k-degree anonymized sequence,d, which minimizes the number of changes from the original degree sequence. However, notice that in case we start the process with a non-ordered degree sequence, we should apply here the inverse transform f −1 to obtain the correct degree sequence.
B. Graph modification
In the second step, changes are made in the original network in order to convert it to a k-degree anonymous network. The anonymized degree sequenced indicates which nodes should modify its degree. In fact,d indicates precisely which nodes must increase or decrease their degree to achieve the desired k-degree anonymity. The changes on the original edges are performed using the basic operations depicted in Figure 1 .
The graph modification starts by obtaining the vector of changes between k-degree anonymous sequence and original degree sequence, δ =d − d. δ allows to easily detect nodes which have to reduce or increase its degree. From δ, we create the list of nodes which must decrease their degree, δ − = {v i | δ i < 0} and the list of nodes which must increase their degree, δ
, it implies that there are the same number of edges in the original network and in the anonymized one and therefore, we only need to apply edge switch modifications. Otherwise, we have to add or delete
edges in order to anonymize the network.
If σ(d) < σ(d), we need to remove
edges from the network, as we have shown on Figure 1b . In order to delete an edge from the network, we choose v i , v j ∈ δ − and find 
Then we delete these two edges and create a new one
edges to the network, as we have shown on Figure 1c . To add an edge, we select v i , v j ∈ δ + where (v i , v j ) ∈ E and create it. Finally, we have to increase the degree of some nodes and decrease others, until σ(d) = σ(d) = 0. This modification is done using edge switch, Figure 1a . For each v i ∈ δ − and v j ∈ δ + , we find another node v k where
We delete this edge and create a new one (v k , v j ).
V. RESULTS
We have tested our algorithm with three real networks. All these networks are undirected and unlabelled. Table I shows a summary of the networks' main features including number of nodes, edges, average degree and k-anonymity value. Caida [11] is an undirected network of autonomous systems of the Internet connected with each other from the CAIDA project, collected in 2007. Amazon [12] is the network of items on Amazon that have been mentioned by Amazon's "People who bought X also bought Y" function. Yahoo! Instant Messenger friends connectivity graph (version 1.0) [13] contains a nonrandom sample of the Yahoo! Messenger friends network from 2003. All tests are made on a 4 CPU Intel Xeon X3430 at 2.40GHz with 32GB RAM running Debian GNU/Linux. Table II shows the candidate set, cand H1 , for the original networks. It shows interesting information about how reidentification risk is distributed on all nodes of the graph. Caida network has 70 re-identificable nodes, i.e., nodes with a unique degree's value, and 217 nodes in high risk of re-identification, i.e., nodes with candidate set size between 2 and 10. Amazon has 90 re-identificable nodes and 535 nodes in high risk of re-identification, and Yahoo! has 73 re-identificable nodes and 331 nodes in high risk of re-identification. Table III shows the results of our experiments. We apply the UMGA algorithm, both on exhaustive and greedy methods, to the three selected networks. We test our algorithm for values of k = {10, 20, 50, 100} on each network and computes the number of possible combinations (2 q ) in order to provide an approximation of the complexity. For each method we show the computation time of the algorithm (time), the difference between the original edge set E and the anonymized oneẼ (ed) and the percentage of modified edges (%mod). Caida is a quite sparse network. More than 49% of their nodes have a degree between 1 and 10, 21.71% between 11 and 100, 18.66% between 101 and 1,000 and 10.26% have a degree greater than 1,000. The maximum degree is 2,628. Because of this, it is necessary to modify more than 6% of the edges in order to get a k = 10. This percentage grows while the value of k grows. For a k = 50 and k = 100 the algorithm needs to modify the total number of edges on 9 (decrease) and 41 (increase) edges. It is about 0.018% of total edges, so we believe that the noise introduced in the network is negligible. We can see similar times and results for exhaustive and greedy methods. The number of possible combinations is small and the exhaustive method can deal with it.
Amazon is a network larger than Caida, so we can see greater differences between exhaustive and greedy methods. The complexity grows up to 2 54 when k = 10. Notice that smaller k-values imply bigger complexity since more group of nodes (g j ) are possible and therefore more possible combinations. When k = 100 there is no solution with p j=1 m j = 0, so the exhaustive method explores all the possible combinations. In this case it is 2 30 and it can be done with relative small amount of time. For other values of k, there is a solution equal to 0, so the exhaustive method do not explores all combinations. Indeed, it explores less than 0.1% in all cases. However, the greedy method finds the same result on all experiments, and it spends much less time.
Yahoo! network is the largest test network, but it is less sparse than others. 99.21% of the nodes have a degree between 1 and 100, 0.75% between 101 and 1,000, and only 0.03% have a degree greater than 1,000. Nodes with a degree value less than 100 are well protected and they are more than 99%. These characteristics imply that k-degree anonymous networks from k = 10 to k = 100 can be achieved with less than 0.20% of modifications on edge set. So, the utility of the anonymized network will be almost intact.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have presented a new algorithm for network anonymization on large networks. It is based on edge set modification in order to achieve the desired k-degree anonymity value. The new algorithm, called Univariate Microaggregation for Graph Anonymization (UMGA) is based on the modification of the degree sequence using univariate microaggregation technique. This process obtains an anonymized degree sequence which is k-degree anonymous and minimizes the distance from the original one. Then we use the basic operations to translate the modifications made on anonymized degree sequence to network edge set.
We have shown that the algorithm is able to anonymize large networks. We have used three different real networks to test the algorithm with two variants based on an exhaustive and a greedy method. Both methods show good results on all networks, but the greedy method spend less time to get similar (in much cases, the same) result. In addition, greedy method remains much more stable over time than exhaustive method. The tests proved that our algorithm can anonymize large real networks based on k-degree anonymity concept.
Many interesting directions for future research have been uncovered by this work. It would be very interesting to think on how the algorithm can work with other network's type. Also, it would be interesting to consider other structural properties as a quasi-identifiers.
